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PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE NEW MARKETPLACE
FOR CRIME
andr6 douglas pond cummingst
ADAM LAMPARELLOtt
I. INTRODUCTION
A felony prison sentence in the United States carries with itd vastating outcomes.' A sentenced inmate loses his liberty
and freedom during the period he is locked up and is often
"sentenced" to brutalization, solitary confinement,
dehumanization, sometimes rape, and an overwhelming scarcity of
options once released from prison.' Imprisonment in the United
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1. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 10 (Greg Ruggiero ed., 2003)
(highlighting a devastating outcome of prison sentences); Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners
Return to the Community: Political, Economic, and Social Consequences, SENTENCING &
CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, Nov. 2000, at 1-5, https://www.ncjrs.gov/p
dflilesl/nij/184253.pdf (discussing the collateral consequences of imprisonment,
including, for example, social disorganization, family disputes, work and economic well-
being, and political alienation); BARBARA S. VINCENT & PAUL J. HOFER, THE
CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS: A SUMMARY OF RECENT
FINDINGS (Fed.Judicial Ctr. ed., 1994), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/conm
anmin.pdf/$filc/conmanmin.pdf (discussing the rounding impact of mandatory
minimum sentencing); Reza Ali Mohseni, The Sociological Analysis of Prison: Costs and
Consequences, 4 J.L. & CONFLIcT REsoL. 13 (2012) (evaluating prison policy from a
pathological point of view); Kevin Johnson, Prison Populations Hinder Budget Cuts, USA
TODAY (Oct. 10, 2011, 9:45 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/NEWS/usaedition/201
1-10-21-LifersSTU.htm (noting an inmate serving life costs states over $30,000 per year).
2. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEWJIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 141 (The New Press, 2012); Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of
Incarceration: Implications for Postprison Adjustment, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: THE
IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 33
(Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003) (examining the devastating psychological
effects of imprisonment); James M. Binnall, Respecting Beasts: The Dehumanizing Quality of
the Modern Prison and an Unusual Model for Penal Reform, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 161, 171-77
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States has devolved into a place where horrific conditions,
inhumane treatment, and degradation have become the norm.
When a felon gains release from prison, he or she faces obstacles
and impediments that often lead a prisoner right back into the
clutches of the prison system. Upon release, formerly incarcerated
persons face discrimination and roadblocks that are nearly
insurmountable for most ex-felons.'
Not only has prison become an unholy experience for
United States prisoners, but as the prison regime in this country
has devolved into the system that exists today, this nation has also
become the world's greatest incarcerator, imprisoning more of its
citizens than any other nation in the world.' Despite its fairly small
population compared to that of other nations, United States
citizens are imprisoned at rates that far exceed any other country.
In fact, "[t]he United States has less than [five percent] of the
world's population. But it has almost a quarter of the world's
(2008) (discussing how prisoners lose their value as human beings as inmates); Craig
Haney, "Infamous Punishment": The Psychological Effects of Isolation, 8 NAT'i. PRISON PROJECT
J. 3 (1993); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological
Analysis ofSupermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 477, 566-67
(1997) (evaluating how solitary confinement commits a felon to the "psychologically
destructive effects of prolonged extreme idleness and social deprivation"); Dana L. Sichel,
Giving Birth in Shackles: A Constitutional and Human Rights Violation, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER
Soc. POL'Y & L. 223, 223 (2008) (underscoring the dehumanizing practice of giving birth
as a pregnant prisoner); Sherwood Ross, America's Dehumanizing Prisons, GLOBAL RES.
(Mar. 22, 2009), http://www.globalrescarch.ca/america-s-dehumanizing-prisons/ 12851
(showing the inhumane conditions that exist in prisons).
3. See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 181.
4. See id. at 141.
5. andr6 douglas pond cummings, "All Eyez on Me": America's War on Drugs and the
Prison Industrial Complex, 15 IOwAj. GENDER RACE &JUST. 417, 419 (2012).
6. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 7 (stating that "[a]lthough crime rates in the
United States have not been markedly higher than those of other Western countries, the
rate of incarceration has soared in the United States while it has remained stable or
declined in other countries"); see ROY WALMSLEY, INST. FOR CRIMINAL POLICY RES., WORLD
PRISON POPULATION LIST (Inst. for Criminal Policy Res. ed., 11th ed. 2016), http://www.p
risonstudies.org/info/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf (emphasizing that the United States,
with more than 2.2 million prisoners, ranks first in the world above China's more than
1.65 million sentenced prisoners); SENTENCING PROJECT, FACTS ABOUT PRISONS AND
PEOPLE IN PRISON (2014), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/incFacts%20
About%20Prisons.pdf (showing that the United States, in 2011, with 716 inmates per
100,000 people, has the highest incarceration rate in the world). Surprisingly, China,
Russia, and Iran, despite highly repressive governments, imprison their citizens at rates
that are significantly less than the United States. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 6. Other
Western countries imprison at rates dramatically lower than the United States. Id.
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prisoners."' Because of this massive incarceration movement that
has gripped the United States for the past three decades, one
might very well speculate that either the United States is
overwhelmed with criminals or that United States streets are safe
and secure because millions of miscreants are locked up behind
bars. Yet, neither speculation is true.
Hundreds of thousands of young men of color are
currently incarcerated in United States prisons for "no truly good
law enforcement reason."' Our nation's streets are not safer,
despite more than two million American citizens behind bars.'
This is so because United States carceral policy has completely lost
its way. For example, law enforcement departments have spent the
past three decades narrowly focusing incredible resources, time,
and policymaking on prosecuting a War on Drugs, which most
now agree is an epic failure.'o When President Richard Nixon
declared a War on Drugs and President Ronald Reagan
federalized and militarized this "war,"" law enforcement lurched
into a regime where low level drug offenders were targeted in our
7. Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
2008, at Al. The United States has 2.3 million criminals behind bars-more than any
other nation. Id. "China, which is four times more populous than the United States, is a
distant second, with 1.6 million people in prison." Id.
8. Eric Holder, U.S. ALL'y Gen., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Association's House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag
/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html (explaining that the vicious cycle of poverty,
criminality, and incarceration traps too many Americans and that the 20th century
criminal justice system is inadequate to handle our 21st century challenges).
9. See MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJECT, AMERICANS BEHIND 11ARS: THE
INTERNATIONAL USE OF INCARCERATION (Sept. 1994), http:// www.prisonpolicy.org/scans
/sp/abb.pdf.
10. Richard Branson, War on Drugs a Trillion-Dollar Failure, CNN (Dec. 7, 2012, 6:05
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/06/opinion/branson-nd-war-on-drugs ("Rather
than continuing on the disastrous path of the war on drugs, we need to look at what works
and what doesn't in terms of real evidence and data."); see Brian Clark Howard, The War
on Drugs is a "Miserable Failure", NAT'i. GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 22, 2013), http://newswatch.nati
onalgeographic.com/2013/01/22/the-war-on-drugs-is-a-miserable-failure; Dylan Mathews,
Kathleen Frydl on the Drug War, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.w
ashingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/04/30/kathlecn-frydl-on-the-drug-war-her
e-we-have-total-and-complete-failure ("[W]c've forgotten how to step back and ask 'Is this
even working?' . . . But, in sum, the drug war has had no meaningful effect."); Roque
Planas, Vicente Fox Sits Down with High Times Magazine to Blast Drug War, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 16, 2013, 5:16 PM), http://www.huflingtonpost.com/2013/07/16/vicente-fox-high-
times n_3606689.html (stating that "[t]he War on Drugs convoked by President Nixon 40
years ago has been a total failure").
11. KATHERINE BECKETrT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 56-58 (Sage Publ'ns ed., 2d ed. 2004).
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nation's urban centers, while more serious and harmful crimes,
such as white collar crime, fraud, and violent crime, became
secondary concerns to local and federal law enforcement
agencies.12 Additionally, the War on Drugs was declared most
forcefully in poor and urban communities, and waged upon the
powerless and voiceless, while drug users and dealers in suburban
areas, beach cities, and college campuses were left largely ignored
and undeterred.'
After three decades, the War on Drugs has netted United
States citizens the following: a multi-trillion dollar taxpayer-
financed price tag;" prison overflow of low-level, non-violent drug
offenders; drug kingpins and cartel leaders left largely
undisturbed;" law enforcement across the nation with Pavlov's-
dog like focus on stings and operations that target low-level
offenders in communities of color;'` blatant and economically
devastating white collar crime and securities fraud dominating the
landscape largely undisturbed;' 7 a nation that turns a blind-eye to
the soulless conditions to which we expose our "criminals" in
12. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 48-49; BECKETT & SASSON, supra note I1, at 57-58.
Beckett and Sasson write:
Once in office, Reagan instructed the new U.S. Attorney General,
William French Smith, to establish a task force to recommend "ways in
which the federal government can do more to combat violent crime."
Because state and local governments are largely responsible for
identifying and prosecuting conventional street crime, however, the
administration's desire to involve the federal government in
combating violent crime was problematic. Nevertheless, the Reagan
administration began to pressure federal law enforcement agencies to
set aside their focus on white-collar offenses and shift their attention
to street crime instead. By October 1981, less than 1 year into the new
administration, the justice Department announced its intention to cut
the number of specialists assigned to identify and prosecute white-
collar criminals in half. The Reagan administration's crackdown on
crime also explicitly excluded domestic violence on the grounds that
it was "not the kind of street violence about which it was most
concerned."
Id. (internal citation omitted).
13. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 60-61; dra cummings, The Economics and Immorality
ofa Failed Drug War, CORP.JUST. BLOG (Aug. 16, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://corporatcjusticcb
log.blogspot.com/2013/08/more-on-holdcr-and-failed-drug-war.html.
14. cummings, supra note 5, at 418.
15. See id.
16. cummings, supra note 13 (noting the systematic targeting of minority and urban
communities).
17. BEcKErr & SASSON, supra note I1, at 58.
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prison;` and a pnvate prison industry that profits handsomely on
these distortions implicit in our country's discriminatory and
deranged drug law enforcement system." No country that
promotes "equal justice under the law" should tolerate a carceral
policy that has inequality in its DNA.
Specifically, shortly after the War on Drugs was declared,
federalized, and militarized in the 1970s, a private for-profit
company in Tennessee sprang up called the Corrections
Corporations of America ("CCA"). 0 The advent of this private
prison corporation ushered in an era where the traditional
government function of crime, punishment, and imprisonment
became intertwined and enmeshed with corporate principles and
goals like profit maximization for shareholders; executive
compensation based on profits and share price; forward-looking
statements forecasting larger prison populations; management's
discussion and analysis focusing on a more robust prison state; and
increased profits built solely on human misery and debasement.'
Today, the prison industrial complex in the United States, of
which CCA is a major player, has proliferated to the point that
perverse incentives drive corporate managers at private prison
companies." Private prison company directors, managers, and
their lobbyists currently work doggedly to increase profits by: (1)
influencing carceral policy so that greater numbers of Americans
face incarceration;2 1 (2) exploiting those imprisoned through
private prison labor contracts;24 (3) lobbying government officials
tirelessly to privatize entire state and federal prison systems;25 (4)
18. See id. at 176-77 (describing the conditions of prisons across the United States).
19. See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 180-81; cummings, supra note 5, at419-20.
20. See generally The CCA Story: Our Company History, CCA, https://www.cca.com/our-
history (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).
21. See cummings, supra note 5, at 419-20.
22. See id. at 434-42 (discussing the various perverse incentives for private for-profit
prisons).
23. Id. at 439-40.
24. See Patrice Fulcher, Emancipate the FLSA: Transform the Harsh Economic Reality of
Working Inmates, 27 ST. JOHN'S .1. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 679, 682 (2015) [hereinafter
Emancipate the FELSA]; Patrice A. Fulcher, Hustle and Flow: Prison Privatization Fueling the
Prison Industrial Complex, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 589 (2012) [hereinafter Hustle] (discussing
the exploitation of prisoners within the prison industrial complex).
25. Chris Kirkham, Private Prison Corporation Offers Cash in Exchange for State Prisons,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2012, 9:37 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/1
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reducing the quality of food and degree of safety for prisoners to
cut costs at privately run facilities;26 (5) drafting legislation and
lobbying for passage of draconian sentencing policies including
mandatory minimums, three-strikes, and illegal immigration
legislation;27 (6) bribing judges and government officials to fill
private prison facilities with children on dubious charges;" (7)
requiring governments that contract for their services to maintain
capacity in the private prisons at ninety percent or risk breach of
contract and higher per diem fees;29 and (8) building new prison
facilities despite no government contract or ready prisoners to fill
them.
4 /pivate-prisons-buying-state-prisons-n_1272143.html. CCA offered to purchase state-
owned prison facilities from forty-eight cash-strapped states, so long as the state
contractually agreed to keep the prisons occupied at ninety percent capacity. Id.
26. CORR. INST. INSPECTION COMM., INSPECTION AND EVALUATION OF THE LAKE ERIE
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION 3-7, 13, 39 (2013), http://big.assets.huflingtonpost.com/lak
ceriereport.pdf, John Burnett, Miss. Prison Operator Out; Facility Called a 'Cesspool', NPR
(Apr. 30, 2012, 8:06 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/24/151276620/firm-leaves-miss-
after-its-prison-is-called-cesspool; see alsoJulic Carr Smyth, Audits: Prison Vendor Charged for
Unserved Meals, YAHOO (July 15, 2013, 9:20 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/audits-prison-
vendor-charged-unserved-174049715.html. But see Simon Hakim & Erwin A. Blackstone,
Cost Analysis of Public and Contract-Operated Prisons (Ctr. for Competitive Gov't, Working
Paper Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/257780985_Cost-Analysi
s-of-Public-and-Contractor-Operated-Prisons-FINAL3 (illustrating cost savings for states in
private prison contracts and private prisons meeting the contract standards set forth by
the states).
27. See cummings, supra note 5, at 438-39.
28. WILLIAM ECENBARGER, KIDS FOR CASH: TWOJUDGES, THOUSANDS OF CHILDREN,
AND A $2.8 MILLION KICKBACK SCHEME (New Press, 2012); Stephanie Chen, Pennsylvania
Rocked by jailing Kids For Cash' Scandal, CNN (Feb. 23, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/200
9-02-23/justicc/pcnnsylvania.corrupt.judges_ I detention-judges-number-of-juvenile-offen
dcrs?s=P'M:CRIME.
As scandals from Wall Street to Washington roil the public trust, the
justice system in Luzerne County, in the heart of Pennsylvania's
struggling coal country, has also fallen prey to corruption. The county
has been rocked by a kickback scandal involving two elected judges
who essentially jailed kids for cash. Many of the children had
appeared before judges without a lawyer.
Id.
29. Kevin Johnson, Private Purchasing of Prisons Locks in Occupancy Rates, USA TODAY
(Mar. 8, 2012, 12:37 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-03-01 /buyi
ng-prisons-requirc-high-occupancy/53402894/1 (finding "[a]t a time when states are
struggling to reduce bloated prison populations and tight budgets, a private prison
management company is offering to buy prisons in exchange for various considerations,
including a controversial guarantee that the governments maintain a 90% occupancy rate
for at least 20 years").
30. Matthew Mulch, Crime and Punishment in Private Prisons, 66 NAT'L LAW. GUILD
REV. 70, 74-75 (2009) (remarking that private prison companies, like the CCA, are
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What seems undeniable now is the perverse and immoral
incentives underlying the private prison industry translate into a
demand for more prisons and prisoners. Simply stated, mass
incarceration, often under inhumane conditions, is good business.
The fact that United States prison conditions are so dehumanizing
and ghastly, and so many prisoners are low-level, non-violent
minor drug offenders, begs the question as to why we as a nation
stand for private corporate profit in the realm of human
imprisonment. The perverse incentives that frantically drive
corporate executives are laid bare when an ever-increasing
number of imprisoned Americans energizes corporate interests.
One private prison analyst recently claimed that the consistent
yearly increase in the prison population "from a business model
perspective [is] clearly good news.""
Private prison profiteers seek to increase privatization of
the industry by promising more efficiently run prisons at lower
costs, safer prisons, and better facilities and outcomes for
prisoners. Recent studies are now showing that these claims by
private prison executives and lobbyists are simply not true."
Private prisons are increasingly shown to be less safe, less efficient,
and less economical.34 The contractual exchange of taxpayer
"building prisons on spec, with no contract to build and no prisoners to house"); see Press
Release, GEO Grp., The GEO Group Reports Second Quarter 2013 Results (2013),
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=91331&p=irol-newsArticlc&lD=1845506&hi
ghlight= (demonstrating GEO's concerns for its idle prisons, stating, "GEO's 2013
guidance does not assume the potential reactivation of approximately 6,000 current beds
in inventory which GEO is actively marketing to local, state, and federal customers.");
Katie Stallcup, Governor: Prison is the Start of Area's Rebuilding, NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT (Aug.
23, 2007, 11:31 PM), http://www.natchezdemocrat.com/2007/08/23/governor-prison-is-
the-start-of-areas-rebuilding (explaining that CCA is confident in constructing a prison
without a contract because, "[w]e don't know exactly when or what, but we know the
demand is out there").
31. JeeYeon Park, Lock Up Profits-in Prison Stocks: Analyst, CNBC NEWS (Nov. 1,
2010, 6:02 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/39949086.
32. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & CAROLINE GLESMANN, PRISON BED
PROFITEERS: How CORPORATIONS ARE RESHAPING CRIMINALJUSTICE IN THE U.S. 2 (Nat'l
Council on Crime & Delinquency ed., 2012), http://nccdglobal.org/sites/default/filcs/p
ublication-pdf/prison-bed-profitecrs.pdf.
33. dra cummings, Private Prison Industry Shenanigans in Florida, CORP. JUST. BLOG
(Oct. 26, 2012, 9:30 AM), http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2012/1 0/private-pri
son-industry-shenanigans-in.html.
34. See; CORR. INST. INSPECTION COMM., supra note 26, at 4-5; cummings, supra note
33; David M. Reutter, Florida Provides Lesson in How Not to Privatize State Prisons, PRISON
LEGAL NEWS (Feb. 15, 2012), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2012/feb/15/
florida-provides-lesson-in-how-not-to-privatize-state-prisons; infra Part Ill.
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funds from governments and municipalities into the hands of the
private prison system is simply a transfer of taxpayer monies into
the personal accounts of private prison shareholders and
executives who provide no real benefit in return, no
manufactured product, and no efficient services. Rather, they
provide taxpayer funded corporate welfare. The private prison
system makes no sense morally, and it increasingly appears that
the industry makes no sense economically.
This article seeks to describe the private prison model in
Part II, highlighting the conclusion that private prison
corporations offer no apparent good or service of value and exist
rather as a means to transfer taxpayer capital into the hands of
private shareholders and corporate executives. Next, in Part III,
the article debunks the notion that private prisons warehouse the
nation's criminals more efficiently and cost-effectively; instead
highlighting emerging evidence that private prisons are less safe,
more costly, and less efficient than government-run prisons.
Thereafter, in Part IV, the article outlines and details the perverse
incentives that motivate corporate executives as they pursue profit
in an industry clearly intended to be run by governments, not by
private interests. Finally, the article outlines a better way toward
sane and safe carceral policy in the United States that includes
eliminating privately run prison corporations completely.
The article concludes by arguing that private prisons
should be eliminated. Until that day, the authors propose several
forward thinking proscriptions. From an economic perspective,
the privatization of prisons in our nation results in inefficient and
immoral outcomes. Crime and punishment in the United States
has lost its way, and we as a country have been lulled into
accepting inhumane and inefficient treatment of those
"criminals" that we decide to imprison, often for no truly sound
law enforcement reason. These two realities, the fairly recent
advent of the private prison corporation, and the increasing trend
of inhumane and brutal treatment of millions of United States
citizens in prison, ultimately leads to the destruction of human
capital and to a dispiriting soullessness in how we, as a collective
citizenry, regard criminals and prisoners that we cast into our
nation's prisons.
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II. THE PRIVATE PRISON MODEL
Since the 1970s, the private prison corporation has been
seeking government contracts to run our nation's prisons on
behalf of the government. 5 As United States incarceration rates
have skyrocketed since 1980, private prisons have reaped lucrative
rewards while providing a steady drumbeat of private prison
lobbyist voices urging the government to increase its incarceration
rates. In return for governments and municipalities turning the
warehousing of prisoners over to private interests, companies like
CCA and GEO Group promise that they will save government and
taxpayer money by running the prisons with greater cost
effectiveness and superior safety." As we report below, recent
studies demonstrate that the facts do not support this claim." In
addition, private prison companies are contracting with large
multinational corporations to provide labor in exchange for
lucrative contracts that do not inure to the benefit of those
inmates that provide the labor-an exchange that looks and feels
in many instances strikingly like modern-day involuntary servitude
or slavery.39 For example, the states of Georgia and Wisconsin do
not pay their inmates at all for the labor they provide to private
industry.40 Why does a system that perpetuates slavery-like
conditions and economically inefficient outcomes continue to be
supported?
Although private prison corporations claim to save money
for local governments by attempting to win prison contracts, the
35. See, e.g., Mulch, supra note 30, at 72-73.
36. cummings, supra note 5, at 423, 437.
37. See HARTNEY & Gi.E.SMANN, supra note 32, at 2.
38. See infra Part 111.
39. Emancipate the FLSA, supra note 24, at 679; Hustle, supra note 24, at 611; Rania
Khalek, 21st Century Slaves: How Corporations Exploit Prison Labor, ALTERNET (July 21,
2011), http://www.alternet.org/story/ 151732/21 stcentury-slaves%3A how corporations.
exploit prison_1abor?page=0%2CO; The U.S. War on Drugs: Political Economics of a New
Slavery, DRUG PoL'Y ALLIANCE (Aug. 2001), http://weh.archive.org/web/2011041364
123/http://www.drugpolicy.org/about/position/racecpaper econ.cfm.
40. Bill Torpy, AfC Watchdog: Real Cost ofPrison Labor; Inmates' "Free" Work has a Price,
ATIANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 20, 2011; see David M. Reutter, Prison Slave Labor Replaces
Freeworld Workers in Down Economy, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (May 15, 2012), https://www.priso
nlegalnews.org/24334_displayArticle.aspx (highlighting that rather than paying prisoners
for labor, some counties in Wisconsin reduce the prisoners' period of incarceration, and
Georgia prisoners provide free labor to the State in exchange for the opportunity to be
hired several years after their release).
WAKE FOREST JOURNAL OF LAW & POLUCY
fundamental basis upon which private prison companies receive
income is through contracts with municipal, state, and federal
governments that promise payment of taxpayer funds to the
private prison companies in exchange for warehousing the
government's criminals in either privately-owned facilities or
government-owned facilities.' This transfer of taxpayer funds to
corporate coffers is based on a per diem rate where governments
contractually owe private prisons a certain fee per bed or per
prisoner.4 2 Thus, the greater the number of prisoners, the greater
the payout from taxpayers to corporate coffers." Many private
prison contracts require that municipalities maintain a ninety
percent occupancy rate, so government leaders are pressured to
maintain a nearly full prison in order to avoid breaching the
contract with the private prison corporation.4 4 Thus, the primary
income potential for private prisons is taxpayer-funded contracts
with governments-a naked transfer of taxpayer funds to private
interests, presumably for better prison service.
To effectuate this transfer of funds from taxpayers to
private prisons shareholders and executives, the private prison
regime and its lobby have become a powerful force in both state
and federal legislative bodies. Further, a conflicted and likely
corrupt relationship has grown between state and federal
legislators-who are empowered to construct law and punishment
practices in the United States-and the private prison corporation
executives that employ all traditional power at their disposal to
influence legislation creation. Nearly all for-profit corporations
engage in activities to influence policymaking in their favor by
paying lobbyists, providing campaign contributions, and
41. Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 458
(2005); see also How LOCKUP QUOTAS AND "Low-CRIME TAXES" GUARANTEE PROFITS FOR
PRIVATE PRISON CORPORATIONS 3 (In the Pub. Interest ed., 2013), http://www.njjn.org/u
ploads/digital-library/Criminal-Lockup-Quota,-In-the-Public-Interest,-9.13.pdf
(explaining the role of lockup quotas in eliminating savings to taxpayers from private
prisons).
42. Brad W. Lundahl ct al., Prison Privatization: A Meta-Analysis of Cost & Quality of
Confinement Indicators, 19 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 383, 384 (2009).
43. cummings, supra note 5, at 440.
44. Id. at 446 n.148; Kevin Mathews, For-Profit Prisons: Eight Statistics that Show the
Problems, TRUTH OUT (Dec. 27, 2013, 9:55 AM), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/20
880-for-profit-prisons-cight-statistics-that-show-thc-problems.
45. See cummings, supra note 5, at 437-39 (discussing the increased role of private
prison lobbies in all levels of politics).
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supporting election campaigns of those legislators friendly to their
cause." However, such efforts reflect a sinister vision concerning
carceral policymaking when private corporate interests are
employing lobbyists, drafting legislation, "purchasing" candidates,
and electioneering for friendly legislators that support prison
profits.4 7
Additionally, the incredible spike in incarcerated American
citizens-more than 335%-over the past thirty years not only
coincides with the War on Drugs but also with the advent of the
private prison corporation.4" This is not a coincidence. As
described below, the private prison regime and its lobby have
literally fanned the flames of the War on Drugs, convincing
Congress to repeatedly adopt more draconian sentencing policies
for even the most minor of drug offenses.49
Increasingly, United States citizens and policymakers are
concluding that private prison corporations should have no role
whatsoever in the traditional government function of criminal
imprisonment."o The profit maximization incentives underlying
46. Id.; see andrd douglas pond cummings, Procuring "Justice"?: Citizens United,
Caperton, and Partisan judicial Elections, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 89, 97-99 (2010)
(discussing the result of Citizens United on political campaign contributions from
corporations).
47. Cf cummings, supra note 5, at 421 (illustrating the sinister nature of private
prisons which encourage incarceration rates to increase, often at the expense of minority
populations in order to earn higher prolits).
48. Id. at 418, 423.
49. NAT'L IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION: RUNAWAY
COSTS FOR IMMIGRATION DETENTION Do NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE 3OLIciEs 7-9 (2013),
http://immigrationlorum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/I0/Math-of-Immigation-Deten
tion-August-2013-FINAL.pdf (describing how the private prison industry lobbies to receive
mandated detention of illegal immigrants for many non-violent crimes); see PAUL ASHTON
& AMANDA PIEFTERUTI, JUSTICE POLICY INST., GAMING THE SYSTEM: How THE POLITICAL
STRATEGIES OF PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION
POLICIES 21 (2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gam
ingthe_system.pdf (analyzing the role of lobbying in affecting incarceration and law
enforcement policy); Laura Carlsen, With Immigration Reform Looming, Private Prisons Lobby
to Keep Migrants Behind Bars, AMERICAS PROGRAM (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.cipamericas
.org/archives/9022 (showing how the private prison industry is "swamping" congressional
committees so that the corporations can lock up more and more "criminals"); Sadhbh
Walshe, How Lawmakers and Lobbyists Keep a Lock on the Private Prison Business, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 27, 2012, 9:55 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfre/2012/sep/27/la
wmakers-lobbyists-keep-lock-private-prison-business (revealing how the CCA lobbies for
harsh drug sentencing and is concerned that profits may fall with decriminalization of
drug laws).
50. See Press Release, Human Rights Def. Ctr., Orgs. Urge U.S. Rep. SheilaJackson
Lee to Reintroduce Private Prison Info. Act (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.media-
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private prisons have proven too perverse and injurious to the basic
civil rights of inmates.' The cost has been too high on both
human capital and state and federal budgets. Collectively, the
United States has suffered the consequences of this failed private
prison exercise in the form of mass incarceration and near
economic ruin for states across the country that are trying to keep
pace with drug sentencing mandated by the War on Drugs as
inspired by the private prison lobby. 2 In August 2013, Attorney
General Eric Holder recognized as much when he declared a
policy shift indicating that the Department of Justice would no
longer prosecute low-level, non-violent drug offenders to the full
extent mandated by law. 3 Unsurprisingly, this announcement was
received poorly by local law enforcement, which has devised and
implemented enforcement efforts for the last thirty years to
prosecute the War on Drugs in communities that offer the least
resistance (i.e., urban minority city centers instead of suburbs and
college fraternities and sororities)." For this reason, Holder's
announcement must have come as a grave disappointment to the
private prison industry that has relied on the incarceration of
millions of low-level, non-violent drug offenders to drive their
profits and share price increases for so long. Perhaps anticipating
a groundswell against the incredibly short-sighted incarceration of
millions of low-level drug offenders, the private prison lobby in
alliancc.org/downloads/HRDC%20press%20releasc%20rc%20PPIA%201ctter%202012-
1.pdf (urging government leaders to take legislative action to increase transparency of
private prisons); Legislature Rejects Private Prison Plan, NEW ME. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2012),
http://www.ncwmainctimes.org/articles/2012/01/10/legislature-rcjects-private-prison-
plan (discussing how Maine's Criminal Justice and Public Safety Committee voted
unanimously against a bill creating private prisons).
51. See DAVID SHAPIRO, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE
PRISONS AND MASS INCARCERATION 23 (2011), https://www.aclu.org/banking-bondage-pri
vate-prisons-and-mass-incarceration?redirect=prisoners-righ ts/banking-bondage-private-pr
isons-and-mass-incarceration.
52. See id. at 10, 20-21.
53. See Holder, supra note 8; dr6 cummings, The Failed War on Drugs and Hip Hop,
HIP HOP L. BLOG (Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.hiphoplaw.blogspot.com/2013/08/the-fail
ed-war-on-drugs-and-hip-hop.html.
54. Mark Leland, Former Law Enforcement Officers Admit "War on Drugs" Waste of
Money, FoxI I NEWS (Feb. 26, 2014), http://foxl lonline.com/archive/former-law-oficers
-admit-war-on-drugs-waste-of-money ("'When we're talking about the money spent on this
war on drugs, it's rather high,' said Brown County SheriffJohn Gossage ... 'There's an
exorbitant amount of money being spent but I believe the stake holders in this
community feel it's very important that we do that.'"); see generally ALEXANDER, supra note
2, at 97-103.
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recent years turned its aggressive attention to incarcerating illegal
immigrants as its next great profit stream.
In sum, private prison companies earn profit in two
primary ways: first, by receiving per diem payments from
government and municipality contracts; and second, by receiving
contract payments in exchange for the labor of prison inmates. In
both instances, the private prison corporation is providing
nothing of true value and no efficient service or product; it is just
a transfer mechanism of taxpayer funds from government coffer
to corporation coffer or a transfer of contracted labor payments
from a private for-profit company into corporation-shareholder-
executive accounts with very little to no economic transfer into
laborer-prisoner accounts.
III. PRIVATE PRISONS ARE PROFIT-DRIVEN ENTERPRISES THAT
THREATEN BASIC CIVIL LIBERTIES
CCA, which is essentially the Enron of the private prison
industry,56 has long touted private prisons as an alternative to
government-owned prisons. Indeed, CCA has set forth three
reasons justifying the creation of private prisons for federal
55. Chris Kirkham, War on Undocumented Immigrants Threatens to Swell U.S. Prison
Population, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.hufingtonpost.com
/2013/08/23/undocumented-immigranLs-prison-n_3792187.html.
Now, just as the federal government has pulled back the throttle on
the drug war, it is embarking on an unprecedented campaign to
criminally prosecute undocumented immigrants crossing the border.
The result: A new wave of non-violent offenders are flooding the
nation's prisons. "This is the crime du jour," said Judith Greene,
director of the nonprofit Justice Strategies, which has focused on the
private prison industry's growing reliance on incarcerating
undocumented immigrants. "It's the drug war all over again. It's
what's driving the market in federal prisons."
Id.
Although the public understands that the "tough on crime" approach
has failed ... the prison industrial complex has already recognized
this rising tide and has latched on to immigration as the next feeder
for their system. They've already started thinking about their next
source of income and they are heavily lobbying for very tough
immigration policies to be put in place ...
LaToya Boh law, Eric Holder's Proposal Could Shift the Focus of the Prison Industrial Complex,
BET (Aug. 20, 2013, 5:06 PM), http://www.bet.com/news/national/2013/08/20/cric-hol
der-s-proposal-could-shift-the-focus-of-the-prison-industrial-complex.h tml.
56. See Ryan S. Marion, Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment Case
Against State Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY BIL RTS.J. 213, 213 (2009).
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inmates: (1) cost effectiveness-private prisons are less expensive
to operate and will save the federal government millions of
dollars;" (2) safety-private prisons effectively protect inmates'
safety;" and (3) humane treatment-private prisons are modern
facilities that provide humane treatment to inmates.'
Studies have shown that private prisons achieve none of
these goals, and the reason is simple: private prisons operate
under a fundamentally different regulatory structure that alters
the choices-and motives-of its participants."o Unlike their
federal counterparts, private prisons operate in a market economy
where maximizing profits is vital to sustainability and thus a
driving factor in corporate decision-making.6 ' Under basic
economic theory, when operational costs exceed current and
future estimates, corporations must identify ways in which to
reduce such costs and therefore increase profitability.6 2 This is
precisely what happened in the private prison context.
Corporations such as CCA often underestimate the cost of
operating private prisons in a manner that would increase safety
and treat inmates more humanely." As a result, operators of
private prisons make the deliberate choice to cut costs. One
scholar notes:
57. See Common Questions and Real Answers About Correctional Partnerships, CORR.
CORP. OF AM., https://www.cca.com/Media/Default/documents/CCA-Resource-Center/
Partnership-QA.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) ("Correctional partnerships provide
federal, state and local governments with the flexibility and savings that taxpayers deserve
and expect. CCA partnership prisons save taxpayers precious tax dollars, allowing
government to spend needed funds in other areas.").
58. See id. at 4 ("Nothing is more important than the safety and security of America's
families and communities. That's why safety and security are at the core of CCA's
mission.").
59. See id. ("Treating inmates humanely isn'tjust the right thing to do. It's also the
safe thing to do.").
60. See, e.g., Matt Shroud, Private Prisons Are Exempted From Federal Disclosure Laws;
Advocates Say That Should Change, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2013, 2:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/mattstroud/2013/02/07/private-prisons-are-xempted-from-federal-disclosure-laws
-advocates-say-that-should-change.
61. For-Profit Prisons, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF TEX. (Jul. 30, 2013, 12:24 PM),
http://www.aclutx.org/strategic-campaigns/criminal-law-reform/for-profit-prisons.
62. EDGAR 0. EDWARDS & PHILIP W. BELL, THE THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF
BUSINESS INCOME 31-32 (Univ. of Cal. Press, 1961); see also Hadar Aviram, Are Private
Prisons to Blame for Mass Incarceration and Its Evils? Prison Conditions, Neoliberalism, and
Public Choice, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 411, 424 (2014).
63. See, e.g., For-Profit Prisons, supra note 61 ("State governments end up paying more
because for-profit prison companies routinely underestimate the cost of oversight,
healthcare, and background checks in their proposals.").
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The cost-cutting focus of private corporations
translates to reduced staffing levels, reduced
investment in training of prison guards, increased
ratios of inmates to correctional officers, and lower
wages for private correctional officers. Low pay,
poor training, and high turnover may contribute to
higher levels of violence in the private sector
prisons. This may in turn encourage private prison
employees to violate prisoners' rights-rights that
would be better safeguarded if government
employees in government-run facilities guarded the
prisoners. This is the predicament of the privately
housed federal prisoner.6 4
On one level, one cannot fault these corporations because
there are only so many options for cost cutting in a prison, and
they all involve areas directly or indirectly affecting inmate safety
and treatment. This includes the quality and availability of health
care, food, bathing, and recreational facilities; the experience
(and quantity) of security personnel; and maintenance of the
prison infrastructure.6 ' This very fact, however, demonstrates why
private prisons inherently cannot achieve their stated objectives
and why their very existence as a profit-making industry threatens
to compromise inmates' basic civil liberties.
Perhaps the most important reason that supports the
elimination of private prisons is their propensity to create a
marketplace for crime." As CCA itself noted when discussing
potential changes to various criminal laws, "any changes with
64. Alison L. Waks, Federal Incarceration by Contract in a Post-Minneci World: Legislation
to Equalize the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1065, 1072-73
(2013).
65. Peter H. Kyle, Note, Contracting for Performance: Restructuring the Private Prison
Market, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2087, 2096-97 (2013).
66. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: The Law of Prisons, I15 HARV. L. REv. 1838, 1872
(2002) ("Not only may private prison companies lobby for preferential treatment, they
may also, as entities that directly profit from incarceration, influence substantive criminal
legislation by supporting tough-on-crime candidates, scaring the public about crime, and
advocating tougher sentencing."); see also ASHTON & PETTERUTI, supra note 49, at 2
("While private prison companies may try to present themselves as just meeting existing
'demand' for prison beds and responding to current 'market' conditions, in fact they have
worked hard over the past decade to create markets for their product.").
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respect to drugs and controlled substances or illegal immigration
could affect the number of persons arrested, convicted, and
sentenced, thereby potentially reducing demand for correctional
facilities to house them."" Put simply, much like an educational
institution requires a sufficient number of students to operate with
a surplus, private prisons need a sufficient number of inmates to
realize a profit. This fact creates a "spillover" effect that
exacerbates a number of already-existing problems in the criminal
justice system.6 ' For example, law enforcement officers, cognizant
of the need to fill private prisons adequately, may exclusively
target poor neighborhoods populated by underrepresented (and
underserved) populations, profile individuals on the basis of race
and ethnicity, and disregard due process and other constitutional
rights.' One commentator explains:
The evidence shows that any short-term cost savings
from private prisons may be hugely expensive in the
long run. They pay poverty-level wages and create a
dangerous environment for corrections officers and
offenders. They increase crime by not preparing
offenders for reentry into society. Private prisons
are a bad deal for every stakeholder in the prison
system.70
Furthermore, as described above, private prisons indirectly
promote dangerous and racially-motivated investigatory practices
and incentivize the extended incarceration of prisoners through
lobbying legislators and advocating for harsh carceral legislation.7 1
For these and other reasons, private prisons should be outlawed.
67. Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 19 (Feb. 25, 2011).
68. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 230; Aviram, supra note 62, at 423; Luca Anderson,
Note, Kicking the National Habit: The Legal and Policy Arguments for Abolishing Private Prison
Contracts, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 113, 116 (2009).
69. Cf Michael Brickner & Shakyra Diaz, Prisons for Profit: Incarceration for Sale, HUM.
RTs., Summer 2011, at 13, 14 (discussing an instance in which a Pennsylvania Juvenile
Court judge was convicted of racketeering for receiving payments from a private prison
company in exchange for him sentencingjuveniles to the company's facility).
70. Matt Simmons, Punishment & Profits: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Private Prisons,
OKLA. POL'Y INST. (Aug. 7, 2013), http://okpolicy.org/punishment-profits-a-cost-benefit-
analysis-of-private-prisons.
71. cummings, supra note 5, at 420-21.
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A. Private Prisons are Not Cost-Effective
Numerous reports undercut the argument that private
prisons are cost-effective. For example, the New York Times reports
that " [d] espite a state law stipulating that private prisons must
create 'cost savings,' the state's own data indicate that inmates in
private prisons can cost as much as $1,600 more per year, while
many cost about the same as they do in state-run prisons.""
Additionally, one study concluded that "cost savings from
privatizing prisons are not guaranteed and appear minimal,"" and
others suggest that "privately operated prisons can cost more to
operate than state-run prisons-even though they often steer clear
of the sickest, costliest inmates."" For example, a study of the
private prison system in Arizona concluded that "the state is
actually losing money-$3.5 million a year-by turning their
inmates over to for-profit corporations."7 5
Finally, the cost-effectiveness argument fails to account for
the fact that private prisons typically only house healthy inmates.
When cost estimates are adjusted to account for this, the results
are surprising:
Without adjusting for the increased medical costs
imposed on state-run prisons, a 2010 Corrections
Department study found that daily per inmate costs
were cheaper in private prisons, at $57.97 as
opposed to $60.66. However, when adjusting for
medical costs, the results flipped with daily per
inmate costs cheaper in state-run prisons at $48.42
compared with $53.02 in private prisons.
72. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in Savings, N.Y. TIMES
(May 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/us/19prisons.html?_r=0.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Aviva Shen, Private Prisons Cost Arizona $3.5 Million More Per Year Than State-Run
Prisons, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 6, 2012, 2:40 I'M), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012
/08/06/641971/privatc-prisons-cost-arizona- 3 5-million-morc-per-ycar-than-state-run-priso
ns.
76. Jonathan Reid, Fact Check: Are State-Run Prisons Cheaper than Private Prisons?,
AZCENTRAL (Oct. 21, 2014, 2:25 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/fac
t-check/2014/10/21/az-fact-check-state-prisons-chcapcr-private-prisons/ 17680289.
77. Id.
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In fact, the United States Government Accountability
Office acknowledged that "without comparable data, [the United
States Bureau of Prisons] is not able to evaluate and justify
whether confining inmates in private facilities is more cost-
effective than other confinement alternatives such as building new
BOP facilities."7 8
As discussed below, even assuming arguendo that private
prisons are more cost-effective than state- and federal-run prisons,
this is achieved through inappropriate cost-cutting measures. As
one commentator notes, " [m]uch of the presumed cost savings of
private prisons are achieved through lower staffing costs: private
prisons pay their employees less than public prisons."7 Cost
cutting can threaten prisoner safety and lead to deplorable prison
conditions."o For example, " [a] private prison in Idaho run by
CCA (which operates three out of four active private prisons in
Oklahoma) established a reputation as a 'gladiator school'
because prison guards encouraged violence between inmates; one
savage beating that took place while guards watched put the victim
in a coma.""' These and other incidents led one commentator to
argue, " [p]rivate prisons have been shown to have more incidents
of misconduct than public prisons.""
At bottom, therefore, cost-effectiveness alone means
nothing without accounting for the quality of the prison
environment, which evidence shows borders on abusive.8 3
While private prison organizations market their
services on the premise of improved prison
conditions at a lower cost, serious defects exist
surrounding this method of incarceration. First, a
lack of accountability and transparency can, and
has, led to increased abuses in private facilities.
78. Christie Thompson, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Private Prisons,
MARSHALL PROJPcr (Dec. 18, 2014, 12:26 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014
/12/18/everything-you-cver-wanted-to-know-about-private-prisons#.RPR56xFXo.
79. Simmons, supra note 70.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Developments in the Law: The Law of Prisons, supra note 66, at 1875 ("Most studies
do not analyze both cost and quality and thus are of limited value in assessing private
prisons. Studies that do not look at both elements simultaneously cannot begin to analyze
the costs and benefits of private prisons.").
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Second, many private prisons face allegations of
mismanagement and dubious business conduct.
Finally, private prison companies strongly lobby for
harsher criminal laws, thereby ironically
contributing to the prison overcrowding epidemic
that states seek to remedy.84
What is worse, these cost-cutting measures are directly
related to the desire to maximize profits: in the past twenty years,
CCA has seen its profits increase by more than five hundred
percent.85 In other words, "[t]he supposed 'cost savings' of for-
profit prisons can result in inadequate medical care, abuse, and
other civil rights violations against the persons incarcerated in
these facilities." 8 6
B. Private Prisons are More Dangerous than State and
Federal Prisons
CCA's cost-cutting and profit-maximizing practices often
lead to inadequate staffing, which results in dangerous and, in
some instances, uncontrollable prison environments. One scholar
who studied CCA's management of a private prison in
Youngstown, Ohio, explains that within fourteen months of its
operation, "the prison 'experienced pivotal failures in its security
and operational management'.... Consequently, CCA prison
guards were unable to control their prisoners."" As a result, some
prisoners were subjected to horrific treatment:
CCA managers employed brutal policies[ ,]..
engaged in excessive use of force against prisoners,
failed to maintain control over weapons, and failed
to implement numerous security procedures. As a
result, there were two homicides, numerous
84. Lauren Salins & Shepard Simpson, Efforts to Fix a Broken System: Brown v. Plata
and the Prison Overcrowding Epidemic, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1153, 1194-95 (2013).
85. Mathews, supra note 44.
86. Brendan Fischer, Violence, Abuse, and Death at For-Profit Prisons: A GEO Group Rap
Sheet, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY (Sept. 26, 2013, 9:38 AM), http://www.prwatch.org/
news/2013/09/12255/violence-abuse-and-death-profit-prisons-geo-group-rap-sheet.
87. Waks, supra note 64, at 1073 (quoting John K. Clark, Inspection and Review of the
Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, U.S. DErP. OFJUST. (Nov. 25, 1998), http://wwwjustice.g
ov/ag/report-attorney-general-inspection-and-review-northeast-ohio-correctional-cen ter).
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stabbings, extreme levels of violence, and six
escapes within the first 14 months."8
Likewise, a study in Mississippi concluded that "privately-
run prisons in the state had assault rates three to five times higher
than the public facilities."" In Oklahoma, it was reported that " [a]
riot at the North Fork Correctional Facility in 2011 resulted in
forty-six injuries, while a four hour long 'disturbance' at the
Cimarron Correctional Facility this year only ended after
corrections officers used bean bag rounds and pepper balls to
subdue the rioters."o One article discussing a private prison in
Mississippi explained that " [b]eatings, rape, robbery and riots are
commonplace, and inmates are denied access to medication and
psychiatric care."9 1
Notably, "inexperience of private prison employees is one
reason for why this violence takes place," which is caused in part
by the high turnover rate at these prisons." One study attributed
violence at private prisons to "high employee turnover,
inadequate training for officers, under-staffing, and miserable
conditions experienced by the inmate population."" The study
compared the rate and severity of violence in private prisons with
their government-run counterparts:
When comparing for-profit prisons with public, a
nationwide study found that assaults on guards by
inmates were [forty-nine] percent more frequent in
private prisons than in government-run prisons.
The same study revealed that assaults on fellow
inmates were [sixty-five] percent more frequent in
for-profit/private prisons. Another study concluded
that, "Privately operated prisons appear to have
systemic problems in maintaining secure facilities"
88. Brief for The Legal Aid Soc'y of the City of N.Y. Supporting Respondent, Corr.
Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2011) (No. 00-860), 2001 WL 826705, at *13.
89. Thompson, supra note 78.
90. Simmons, supra note 70.
91. Emily Le Coz, Lawsuit Alleges "Barbaric" Conditions at Mississippi Prison, REUTERS
(May 30, 2013, 7:39 PM), http:// www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-mississippi-prison-idUS
BRE94T17220130530.
92. Simmons, supra note 70.
93. Fischer, supra note 86.
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concluding that for-profit/private prisons have
significantly more escapes, homicides, assaults, and
drug abuse compared to government-run prisons.94
Thus, there can be little doubt that "there are structural
problems with private prisons that increase the risk of bad and
sometimes lethal outcomes."9 '
C. Pivate Prisons Subject Inmates to Inhumane
Conditions
The living environments at many private prisons deprive
many inmates of basic needs."6 For example, "[o]ne way for for-
profit prisons to minimize costs is by skimping on provisions,
including food."" In fact, a psychiatrist who investigated a private
prison in Mississippi "found that the inmates were severely
underfed and looked 'almost emaciated.""' In fact, "[d]uring
their incarceration, prisoners dropped anywhere from [ten] to
[sixty] pounds.""
Sadly, numerous reports detail startling examples of
deplorable prison conditions. At one Mississippi prison, "an
otherwise healthy inmate had to have a testicle removed
after prison officials repeatedly denied his request for medical
help when it swelled to the size of a softball from cancer." "
Additionally, some prisoners live in "filthy quarters without
working lights or toilets, forcing them to defecate on Styrofoam
trays or into trash bags."' 0 '
94. Id.
95. Allison Torres Burtka, Problems with Prison, AM. Ass'N FORJUST., Dec. 2011, at 24,
29.
96. See Le Coz, supra note 91 (noting that a lawsuit alleged that inmates live in rat-
infested filth and that their "human rights are violated daily").
97. Mathews, supra note 44.
98. Id. (citing Holbrook Mohr, Mississippi Pison Run by Utah Company Called
"Barbaric", SALT lAKE TRIB. (May 30, 2013, 4:57 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?
ref=/sltrib/new/56385710-78/lawsuit-prison-mississippi-prisoners.html.csp).
99. Id.
100. Le Coz, supra note 91.
101. Id. One commentator summarized a recently-filed complaint against CCA that
set forth in detail the grave conditions at East Mississippi Correctional Facility:
The complaint lists a litany of such horrors, but here are a few
highlights: rampant rapes. Placing prisoners in solitary confinement
for weeks, months or even years at a time, where the only way to get a
guard's attention in an emergency is to set a fire. Rat infestations so
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Furthermore, in a comprehensive report, Warehoused and
Forgotten: Immigrants Trapped in Our Shadow Private Prison System,
the American Civil Liberties Union described the shocking
conditions of confinement at one private prison:
At Reeves County Detention Center in late 2008
and early 2009, after a prisoner died from
inadequate medical care, prisoners organized
uprisings that got so out of control they ended with
prisoners setting fire to the facility. Then, in the
summer of 2013, prisoners started a petition to
protest crowded conditions, bad food, and lack of
medical care. When prison staff learned of the
petition, they reportedly sought out the protest
organizers, tear-gassed their dormitories, shot at
them with rubber bullets, and then locked in
isolation cells both the organizers and bystanders
who objected to being tear-gassed. 02
Similarly, a class-action lawsuit against Walnut Grove Youth
Correctional Facility asserted, "children there are forced to live in
barbaric and unconstitutional conditions and are subjected to
excessive uses of force by prison staff."'0 '
bad that vermin crawl over prisoners; Sometimes, the rats arc
captured, put on leashes and sold as pets to the most severely mentally
ill inmates. Many suicide attempts, some successful. The untreated
mentally ill throw feces, scream, start fires, electrocute themselves and
self-mutilate. Denying or delaying treatment for infections and even
cancer. Stabbings, beatings and other acts of violence. Juveniles being
housed with adults, including one 16-year-old who was sexually
assaulted by his adult cell mate. Malnourishment and chronic hunger.
Officers who deal with prisoners by using physical violence.
Jill Filipovic, America's Private Prison System is a National Disgrace, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 31,
2015, 6:27 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/13/aclu-lawsuit-
east-mississippi-correctional-facility.
102. AM. CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAREHOUSED AND FORGOTfEN: IMMIGRANTS
TRAPPED IN OUR SHADOW I'RIVATE PRISON SYSTEM 26 (2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/
default/files/field-document/060614-aclu-car-reportonline.pdf.
103. Federal Lawsuit Reveals Inhumane Conditions at For-Profit Youth Prison, SOUTHERN
POVERTy L. CrR. (Nov. 16, 2010), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2010/11/16/federal-
lawsuit-reveals-inhumane-conditions-profit-youth-prison.
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These conditions are traceable to the demand upon private
prisons to consistently operate at nearly maximum capacity.'o As
one commentator notes, " [s] tates sign agreements with private
prisons to guarantee that they will fill a certain number of beds in
jail at any given point,""o' and "[t]he most common rate is [ninety
percent], though some prisons are able to snag a [one hundred
percent] promise from their local governments." 0 6 Because of
these contracts, "the state is obligated to keep prisons almost full
at all times or pay for the beds anyway, so the incentive is to
incarcerate more people and for longer in order to fill the
quota." 107
While the above evidence demonstrates that private prison
corporations' mantra or promise of "more safe," "more efficient,"
and "more cost-effective" is bankrupt, if not fraudulent, the
private prison regime continues to thrive in the United States.
Private prisons thrive primarily on effective propaganda and
relationships with lawmakers around the nation, including
through lobbying efforts, campaign contributions, and the
specious argument that private industry will always operate more
efficiently than government facilities. As the above discussion
demonstrates, in the case of the privatized prison corporation, this
is simply not true. What is true is that perverse and immoral profit
incentives motivate private prison leaders to act and establish
policies that harm human beings and trample basic civil liberties.
IV. PERVERSE INCENTIVES THAT MOTIVATE PRIVATE PRISON
POLICY
Perhaps the most perverse incentive in the private prison
industry is that shareholder and executive profit are intimately
tied to the number of prisoners that enter the private prison
facility.'" The evidence shows that when a profit motive depends
104. Mathews, supra note 44 (noting that private prisons have an incentive to
incarcerate more individuals because of their contracts with states to operate at near-
capacity or pay for the beds otherwise).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. cummings, supra note 5, at 436-38.
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on incarcerating prisoners on a mass scale, citizens are subject to
abuses of the most intolerable and undemocratic kind..
For example, private prison companies-while forcefully
disclaiming such activityio-actively lobby for harsher prison
sentences such as mandatory-minimums or three-strikes;'o lobby
for legislation that creates new crimes requiring incarceration,
such as criminalization of illegal immigration or active detention
of schoolchildren;' enter into contracts that mandate capacity
109. See Richard P. Scitcr, Corr. Section, Acad. of Criminal justice Sci., Private
Corrections: A Review of the Issues, CORR. CORP. OF AM. (Mar. 2008),
www.cca.com/static/assets/Private CorrReview-of-Issues.pdf (purporting to respond to
issues and criticism levied against private corrections, including disclaiming any lobbying
efforts for harsher prison sentences by CCA). According to CCA:
Myth: Private companies are actively engaged in legislation to
promote longer and tougher sentences in order to keep beds filled
and increase profits. Reality: The industry absolutely does not
participate in or lobby for stricter sentencing. In fact, several
companies in this industry provide services that serve as alternatives to
sentencing, such as electronic monitoring, day reporting centers and
probations services. Lobbying for longer sentences does not lead to
increased business. Providing safe, secure facilities that offer
meaningful programs and services for inmates does.
Myths vs. Reality in Private Corrections: The Truth Behind the Criticism, CORR. CORP. OF AM.,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/cca myth-vs._rcality-in-correctio
nspromotionalsheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). But see Lee Fang, Disclosure Shows
Private Prison Company Misled on Immigration Lobbying, THE NATION (June 4, 2013), http://
www.thenation.com/blog/ 174628/disclosure-shows-private-prison-company-misled-immig
ration-lobbying# ("Earlier this year, one of the largest private prison corporations in the
country sent out a statement to reporters claiming that it would not lobby in any way over
the immigration reform debate. A new disclosure shows that the company, the Boca
Raton-based Geo Group, has in fact paid an 'elite team of federal lobbyists' to influence
the comprehensive immigration reform legislation making its way through Congress.").
110. cummings, supra note 5, at 438-39.
111. See generally Nicole Flatow, Mississippi County jails Kids For School Dress Code
Violations, Tardiness, DOJ Alleges, THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 27, 2012, 9:00 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/1l/27/1239111 /mississippi-county-jails-kids-for-sc
hool-dress-code-violations-tardiness-doj-alleges (describing how the police are a "taxi-
service" for shuttling students to jail for class misbehavior); C6sar Cuauhtimoc Garcia
Hernindez, Largest Private Prison Company, CCA, Maintains Strong Immigration Business,
CRIMMIGRATION BLOG (Aug. 20, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2013/08/20
/largest-private-prison-company-cca-maintains-strong-immigration-business.aspx; julianne
Hing, The Shocking Details of a Mississippi School-to-Prison Pipeline, COLORLINES (Nov. 26,
2012, 9:34 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/1I/school-prison-pipeline-merid
ian.html (explaining how breaking a school dress code can lead to a trip to a detention
center); Locating the School-to-Prison Pipeline, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.
org/racial-justice/school-prison-pipeline-fact-shect-pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2016)
(reflecting on the "school-to-prison pipeline" and the imposition of severe punishment
for minor disciplinary infractions, which perpetuates a child's involvement in the criminal
justice system); Joaquin Sapien, Time Out: Federal Complaint Alleges Rampant Abuse in Texas
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minimums in their prison facilities or a contract breach will
result;" 2 provide manufacturing and service labor to private
industry at low or no cost by using inmates as workers and reaping
massive profits on the backs of those prisoners;''- and steadily
decrease services and humane treatment of inmates to cut costs to
increase shareholder profits and executive compensation." 4 These
activities are common behavior for many corporations, which seek
assertively to increase profits for shareholders."' But in the private
prison context, such activities lead to civil and human rights
violations."6 In truth, the very existence of the private prison
corporation flies in the face of the corporate social responsibility
movement, as nearly every activity the private prison company
advocates is arguably the antithesis of responsible corporate
citizenship. "7
Ultimately, private prisons' existence, if not simply to
enrich shareholders and executives, is dependent on whether the
private prison regime actually delivers a more cost-effective,
efficient, and safer system of warehousing criminals." 8 This is the
only avenue for which it makes sense to turn a traditional
government function and taxpayer funds over to the private
sector. Private prison lobbyists and executives base their pleas for
government contracts on the fact that they can imprison more
efficiently and more cost effectively."' If they cannot, the idea of
Truancy Program, PROPUBLICA (June 12, 2013, 3:17 PM), http://www.propublica.org/artic
le/federal-com plaint-alleges-rampant-abuse-in-texas-truancy-program (highlighting that
children can be led out in handcuffs for school tardiness).
112. Johnson, supra note 29.
113. cummings, supra note 5, at 422; Hustle, supra note 24, at 611.
114. See generally Reutter, supra note 34 (inferring from a study of private prisons in
Florida, which showed that recidivism rates are equal to or higher than public prisons and
the private prison system has not saved costs or been a solution to the ever-expanding
prison system, that resources to private prisons are being diverted from prisoner needs to
shareholders and executives).
115. cummings, supra note 5, at 435-36.
116. Le Coz, supra note 91 (discussing a private prison's oversight that led to
"barbaric condition [s]," inhumane treatment, and human rights violations).
117. But see Social Responsibility at CCA, CCA, http://www.cca.com/social-responsibility
(last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (describing CCA's dedication to being "a socially responsible
organization and a strong corporate citizen").
118. But see Oppel, supra note 72 (noting that private prisons cost more to operate
than state-rmn prisons, even though they avoid accepting sick, costly inmates).
119. See Simon Hakim & Erwin Blackstone, Private Prisons Offer Big Savings for Maine
Corrections Budget, CENTRALMAINE.COM (May 23, 2013), http://www.kjonlinc.com/opinio
n/MAI NE-COMPASS-Private-prisons-offer-big-savi ngs-for-Maine-corrections-budget-. html;
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private prison company existence is nothing more than a naked
transfer of taxpayer funds into the hands of corporate
shareholders and executives. All indicators now point to the fact
that the private prison regime does not deliver more cost-effective,
efficient, and safer warehousing of criminals. Thus, there is no
rational reason for the private prison corporation to continue.
The time has come to end the private prison experiment, as it has
been a failure.
V. OUTLAWING THE PRIVATE PRISON MODEL
Democratic Presidential Candidate and United States
Senator Bernie Sanders stated that "[s]tudy, after study, after
study has shown private prisons are not cheaper, they are not
safer, and they do not provide better outcomes for either the
prisoners or the state." 2 0 As such, Senator Sanders recently
introduced legislation that would effectively ban private prisons.' 2 1
A. The Legislation
The bill,_ titled the justice is Not for Sale Act, seeks to
prohibit federal and state governments from entering into
contracts with private prisons within two years of enactment.'2 2
The Act also seeks the following: (1) reinstatement of federal
parole guidelines for eligible prisoners to be released prior to
completing their sentences;'12 (2) elimination of the requirement
that Immigration and Customs Enforcement meet a 34,000 bed
quota, which results in "the detention and abuse of
undocumented immigrants to the financial benefit of prison
corporations like GEO and CCA";'24 and (3) regulation of video
and telephone services in correctional facilities, which
Simon Hakim & Erwin Blackstone, Privately Run Prisons Offer Value to Ohio, THE BLADE
(July 21, 2013), http://www.toledoblade.com/Opinion/2013/07/21/Privately-run-prison
s-offer-value-to-Ohio.html.
120. See Carimah Townes, Bernie Sanders Unveils Ambitious Plan to End Private Prisons,
THINKPROGRESS (Sep. 17, 2015, 12:55 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2015/09/1
7/3702659/bernic-sanders-prison-bill.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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"overcharge inmates to the benefit of staff and corporate
entities."'25
Senator Sanders's proposal should be commended for
drawing attention to the fact that private prisons achieve none of
the objectives upon which their existence is based and that
inmates suffer substantial and ongoing abuses in such prisons.
Senator Sanders's legislation underscores the need for systemic
reforms to ensure that private prisons operate with greater
transparency and accountability and to safeguard inmates from
violent and inhumane prison environments. As a practical matter,
however, given the current state of partisan rancor and the
existing contracts between the federal government and private
prisons, 126 it is unlikely that Congress will pass Senator Sanders's
proposal
B. New Proposal for Eradicating Private Prisons
Thus, we strongly believe that the private for-profit prison
corporation model has failed and continues to fail, therefore our
starting point is the same as Senator Sanders, which is that private
prisons should be eliminated altogether. In fact, nascent and
current private prison scholars have argued that the entire private
prison construct is unconstitutional.12 That said, because outright
elimination is unlikely with the current Congress, several
preliminary steps could be taken to begin the process of ending
the perverse and immoral outcomes attendant to the private
prison regime. To wit, Congress should consider several proposals
to address the documented problems with private prisons,
including: (1) ending the War on Drugs; (2) creating a federal
agency to oversee the administration of private prisons; (3)
affording private prisoners limited constitutional protections; and
(4) creating a statutory cause of action against owners and
employees of private prisons for conduct that violates
constitutional rights.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. See Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: A Violation of U.S. Domestic Law,
International Human Rights, and Good Sense, 13 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 12 (2006); see also Ira P.
Robbins, Symposium, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 69JUDICATURE 325
(1986).
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i. End the War on Drugs
Additionally, the discriminatory nature by which law
enforcement has prosecuted the War on Drugs has led to
devastated urban communities and incredible distrust between
citizens of color and law enforcement.12  A sickness has infected
the United States for thirty years-namely a drug war flamed by
private prison influence-and it appears now that the momentum
for a sea change is mounting as the time has come to cure this
fever.
The War on Drugs is an unadulterated failure that has,
among other things, failed to eradicate drug use or treat drug
addiction, led to overcrowding in federal prisons, and resulted in
racially motivated investigatory practices. Indeed, despite spending
a trillion dollars to reduce drug use,'29 studies show that "[a]bout
[forty] percent of high school seniors admit to having taken some
illegal drug in the last year-up from [thirty] percent two decades
ago." 1s0 Furthermore, the Global Commission on Drug Policy
estimated that, "between 1998 and 2008, global use of opiates
increased [thirty-four point five] percent, cocaine [twenty-seven]
percent, and cannabis [eight point five] percent."'"' Additionally,
in 2011, over fifty percent of federal inmates were incarcerated for
drug offenses, compared with four percent for robbery; three
percent for homicide, assault, and kidnapping; and five percent
for sex offenses.1 32
At the same time, rehabilitative services for such offenders
is virtually non-existent.' 3 3  Furthermore, sixty-one percent of
individuals who are targeted by Special Weapons and Tactics
("SWAT") teams for drug-related crimes are persons of color.1 34
128. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 50; see also dr6 cummings, Professor Calls War on
Drugs an "Abomination", CORP.JUST. BLOG (July 15, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://corporateju
sticeblog.blogspot.com/201 3/07/professor-calls-war-on-drugs-abomination.html.
129. Branson, supra note 10.
130. Eduardo Porter, Numbers Tell of Failure in Drug War, N.Y. TIMEs (July 3, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/business/in-rcthinking-the-war-on-drugs-start-with-
the-numbcrs.html?_r=0.
131. Hao Li, War on Drugs a "Total Failure" and Statistics to Prove It, INT'L BUS. TIMES
(June 17, 2011, 9:53 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/war-drugs-total-failure-statistics-provc-
it-291447.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Avinash Thoroor, Five Startling Statistics that Prove the War on Drugs is a Failure,
RESET.ME (July 7, 2014), http://resct.me/story/five-startling-numbers-failed-war-drugs.
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These facts demonstrate that the War on Drugs is a complete
failure and that it is a substantial factor underlying the perceived
need for private prisons. It is not surprising, therefore, that
corporations such as CCA would resist any changes to federal drug
policy; if the War on Drugs ends, the need for profit-driven private
prisons is significantly decreased.
ii. Create Stricter Agency Oversight
Based on the substantial evidence of abuse and inhumane
treatment at private prisons, corporations like CCA should be
subject to oversight by a federal administrative agency. This would
enable the federal government to establish standards governing
the administration of private prisons, including maintenance of
facilities, treatment of prisoners, and financial viability. In doing
so, the agency could increase transparency and accountability and
more readily uncover instances of prisoner abuse.
iii. Afford Private Prisoners Limited
Constitutional Protections
In Minneci v. Pollard,"' the United States Supreme Court,
by an eight to one vote, held that federal inmates may not recover
damages for alleged Eighth Amendment violations that were
committed by private prison employees, even where their
employer is under contract with the federal government."'3  The
Court's rationale was based in substantial part on the fact that
prisoners have alternative remedies under state law, thus
rendering damages for alleged constitutional violations
unnecessary.3 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen Breyer
explained that "state law imposes general tort duties of reasonable
care (including medical care) on prison employees in every one of
135. Minncci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that, in some circumstances,
citizens may sue federal oficials for violations of constitutional rights).
136. Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 626 ("[Wlhere, as here, a federal prisoner seeks damages
from privately employed personnel working at a privately operated federal prison, where
the conduct allegedly amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and where that
conduct is of a kind that typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law (such as
the conduct involving improper medical care at issue here), the prisoner must seek a
remedy under state tort law.").
137. See id.
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the eight States where privately managed secure federal facilities
are currently located."' 38
To an extent, the Court's decision to not permit such suits
makes sense, particularly given that inmates may sue prison
officials in state court for alleged violations. However, one
problem, as recognized in Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's dissent,
is that state law may not always provide a sufficient remedy for
misconduct by private prison officials.'13  Furthermore, Justice
Ginsburg correctly noted that suits for constitutional violations,
which are available for inmates in federal facilities, should not be
denied to those who by chance are placed in a private prison.o
In addition, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the majority's
failure to sufficiently consider deterrence as a reason to permit
inmates to sue prison officials."' Specifically, Respondent's suit
sought "damages directly from individual officers";"' thus, under
Bivens, a successful suit "would have precisely the deterrent
effect"l43 to justify citizens' suits against federal officials. 14 4
iv. Provide a Statutory Cause of
Action for Injuries Sustained in
Private Prisons
It is unlikely that civil suits against prison officials will result
in the type of systemic change that is needed to reform private
prisons. These suits-which would be brought by prisoners acting
138. Id. at 624 (citing DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, WEEKLY
POPUlATION REPORT (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.bop.gov/locations/weekly-reportjsp
(listing eight states where prison guards have duty of reasonable care)). The Court
rejected the argument that there are certain "kinds of Eighth Amendment claims that
state tort law does not cover," holding that respondent failed to provide examples
demonstrating this fact and that "State-law remedies and a potential Bivens remedy need
not be perfectly congruent." Id. at 625.
139. Id. at 625 ("[S]tate tort law may sometimes prove less generous than would a Bivens
action, say, by capping damages ... or by forbidding recovery for emotional suffering
unconnected with physical harm . . . or by imposing procedural obstacles, say, initially
requiring the use of expert administrative panels in medical malpractice cases . ).
140. Id. at 626-27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 627.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id. (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70-71 (2001) (prohibiting
suit against CCA because a suit against a corporate employer "would not serve to deter
individual officers from conduct transgressing constitutional limitations on their
authority") (emphasis added)).
144. Id.
[Vol. 6:2436
2016]PRIVATE PRISONS & THE NEWMARKETPLACE FOR CRIME 437
in a pro se capacity in many cases 4 5 -would not likely be
successful on a consistent basis. In addition, the sheer length of
time from the filing of a complaint through formal adjudication
would mean that prison officials' wrongdoing would likely persist
over this time.'
Accordingly, and particularly in light of Minneci, Congress
should enact a statute prescribing a specific cause of action for
violations of inmates' constitutional rights, including the Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment and the
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. Such a statute
should provide remedies that will operate to deter prison officials
and administrators from engaging in such conduct, including-
but not limited to-respondeat superior liability and punitive
damages where conduct is particularly egregious.
V. CONCLusioN
When did imprisonment in the United States become a
system characterized by the inhumane treatment of prisoners,
rather than by a system of rehabilitation, recovery, and reduced
recidivism? Why did we decide to incarcerate low-level, non-violent
drug offenders along with hardened criminals who are convicted
of truly deprave acts of violence and anti-social behavior? The
result of this policy has been to create a generation of formerly
incarcerated persons that have been brutalized and hardened
despite "no truly good law enforcement reason." 4
Draconian carceral policies continue in our nation's laws that
deprive former felons of opportunities to truly re-enter society
successfully.14 8 For example, gangs dominate many of our nation's
prisons."' Failing to affiliate with a gang upon prison entrance can
lead to vicious attacks from all sides.' Many inmates in state and
145. See, e.g., id. at 620 (majority opinion).
146. See, e.g., id. at 620-21; Alice Brennan, Right to a Speedy Trial? This Innocent
Teenager Waited3 Years in Jail, FUSION (Apr. 28, 2014, 11:41 AM), http://fusion.net/story/
5419/right-to-a-speedy-trial-this-innocent-tcenager-waitcd-3-years-in-jail.
147. Holder, supra note 8.
148. See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 186.
149. See Kate King Ct al., Violence in Supermax: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 88 PRISON J.
144, 152 (2008).
150. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., 2011
NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT: EMERGING TRENDS (2011), https://www.fbi.gov/sta
ts-services/publications/201 1-national-gang-threat-assessment.
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federal prison experience sexual assault.'"' Physical danger is a
daily concern for those that are locked up, from both prison
guards and fellow inmates. 1 2 Dehumanization and mind-bending
hours of solitary confinement are regularly imposed upon those in
our prisons.'1 3 Many prisoners spend their days and nights in
literal cages, treated no better than common animals.'
As a nation, we can, and should, do better. Juxtaposing the
way that prisoners are treated in the United States against the way
prisoners are treated in countries such as Norway and Austria can
be a useful exercise for those charged with carceral policymaking
in the United States. Some of the prisons in Norway and Austria
are centers constructed around the notion of humane and safe
treatment of violent criminals.' 5 They are solidly constructed and
secure, yet bear no resemblance to the cages used to house
inmates in the United States.'5 6 One of the reasons that some
European jails are so much more humane than United States
prisons is because these nations, and indeed all of the nations in
the world, incarcerate at far lower rates and percentages than we
151. ALLEN J. BECK & CANDACE JOHNSON, U.S. )EP'T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL
VICTIMIZATION REPORTED 1Y FORMER STATE PRISONERS, 2008, at 8 (2012); Keri Huus,
Nearly 10 Percent of Inmates Suffer Sexual Abuse, MSNBC (May 17, 2012, 10:14 AM),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/05/17/11745732-report-nearly-10-percent-of-in
mates-suffer-sexual-abuse?lite. Of those inmates that admit to suffering sexual assault:
A quarter of those who reported they had suffered unwanted sexual
contact at the hands of other inmates said they had been physically
held down or restrained and a quarter had been physically harmed or
injured. Nearly a quarter (23 percent) reported serious injuries,
including anal/vaginal tearing (12 percent), chipped or lost teeth (12
percent), being knocked unconscious (8 percent), internal injuries (6
percent), knife/stab wounds (4 percent) or broken bones (4 percent),
according to the survey of former prisoners.
Id.
152. See Huus, supra note 151.
153. Sherwood Ross, America's Dehumanizing Prisons, GLOBAL RES. (Mar. 22, 2009),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/america-s-dehumanizing-prisons/12851.
154. Id.
155. Compare Jim Lewis, Behind Bars ... Sort of N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 10, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/magazine/14pisons-L.html?pagewanted=all&-_r-0,
with Norway's Halden Prison, REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/news/pictures/slidesho
w?articleld=USRTR2PCUO#a= I (last visited Feb. 29, 2016).
156. See Lewis, supra note 155. But see Laura Gottesdiener, California Prison System
Inmates Suffer from Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Supreme Court Rules, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 24, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/24/california-prison-ystem-su
preme-court-ruling-n_866486.html.
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do.' This allows for common sense construction of prisons that
are humane and not overcrowded, and a carceral policy in which
the need to protect public safety does not entail subjecting
prisoners to appalling abuse.
A wiser and safer prison policy in the United States begins
by ending the scourge of the private prison corporation and
returning crime and punishment to public function. In addition,
sentences should be reduced for non-violent offenses. Likewise,
the War on Drugs should end, marijuana should be legalized, and
treatment for addicts should be widely available. We should also
stop the current criminalization of immigration in its tracks and
block the private prison lobby from influencing legislation
concerning immigration policy. Furthermore, prisoners should be
provided a fair wage for work done in prison, allowing them a re-
entry account upon release filled with the money they earned
while working in prison.' Finally, prison cells should be humane,
habitable, and populated by one inmate. The result will be safer
crime and punishment policies, with fewer American citizens
incarcerated.
At their core, private prisons reflect a continuation of
policies that have tainted the criminal justice system with
perceptions of arbitrariness, unfairness, and injustice. As this
article has shown, the continued proliferation of private prisons
does not save taxpayers money, increase prison safety, or elevate
the conditions of the prison environment. They do the opposite.
Inmates are being physically abused, denied medical care, and
forced to endure inhumane living conditions, as corporations like
CCA and GEO Group realize higher profits from a marketplace in
which prisoners are in high demand. Indeed, CCA is a textbook
example of the grave injustices that can occur when profit
maximization clashes with human dignity. In truth, private prisons
have existed on dubious constitutional grounds since their
inception in the 1980s.
The time has arrived for private prisons to be eliminated
and for legislators and courts to realize that this experiment is one
that has failed. Until that time comes, Congress should implement
157. See CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY, NAT'I COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, U.S.
RATES OF INCARCERATION: A GLOBAL PERSPEcrIVE 2 (Nov. 2006), https://www.nccdglobal
.org/sites/default/files/publication pdf/facshect-us-incarceration.pdf.
158. Emancipate the FLSA, supra note 24, at 682.
440 WAKE FORESTJO URNAL OF LAW& POLICY [Vol. 6:2
purpose-driven reforms to ensure that private prisons can no
longer be institutions where inmates have theoretical rights but no
remedies.
